Can a Shareholder Be Forced to Sell Their Shares?

Compulsory Buy-Outs, Shareholder Deadlocks and Lessons from Recent Case Law
Many businesses are founded on a shared vision, mutual trust and common goals. However, as businesses evolve, relationships between shareholders may deteriorate. Disagreements over management, profit distribution or control of the company can escalate to the point where shareholders can no longer work together.
This raises an important question: Can a shareholder be compelled to sell their shares and exit the company simply because the relationship between shareholders has broken down?
As with most legal questions, the answer depends on the circumstances. In this article, we explore when, and on what legal grounds, a shareholder may be compelled to sell their shares.
SHAREHOLDER VS DIRECTOR
Before considering whether a shareholder can be compelled to sell their shares, it is important to distinguish between a shareholder and a director.
A shareholder holds an ownership interest in the company, whereas a director is responsible for participating in its management and oversight. In terms of section 66(1) of the Companies Act 71 of 2008 ("the Act"), the business and affairs of a company must be managed by or under the direction of its board of directors.
Although a person may hold both positions, removing them as a director does not automatically affect their shareholding.
For example, where two shareholders each own 50% of a company and one is removed as a director, that person retains their 50% shareholding unless their shares are lawfully transferred or otherwise dealt with in accordance with the applicable legal requirements.
THE RELEVANCE OF SHAREHOLDERS' AGREEMENTS AND MOIs
As a general rule, a shareholder cannot be compelled to sell their shares merely because the other shareholders no longer wish to remain in business with them.
However, a properly drafted shareholders' agreement or Memorandum of Incorporation (MOI) may provide for circumstances in which a shareholder is required to offer or transfer their shares.
For example, these documents may contain provisions dealing with:
a shareholder's resignation or departure from the business;
material breaches of the shareholders' agreement;
the death, disability or insolvency of a shareholder;
compulsory buy-out procedures;
deadlock resolution mechanisms, including put and call options;
the valuation of shares; and
restrictions on transferring shares to third parties.
Shareholders' agreements and MOIs may also contain drag-along and tag-along provisions. A drag-along provision may allow shareholders holding a specified majority to compel other shareholders to sell their shares as part of a qualifying sale transaction. Conversely, a tag-along provision generally protects minority shareholders by allowing them to participate in a proposed sale by other shareholders.
These provisions can facilitate an orderly separation between shareholders and reduce the risk of costly litigation. However, their operation depends on their terms and enforceability.
WHEN SAREHOLDES REACH AN IRRETRIEVABLE DEADLOCK
In more serious cases, disagreements between shareholders may escalate to the point where they can no longer agree on important decisions or continue their business relationship.
Section 81(1)(d) of the Act permits the winding-up of a solvent company by court order in specified circumstances. These include certain forms of deadlock between directors or shareholders, as contemplated in sections 81(1)(d)(i) and (ii), or where it is otherwise just and equitable to wind up the company under section 81(1)(d)(iii).
Importantly, the just-and-equitable ground is not limited to circumstances where the company can no longer function. In appropriate cases, the irretrievable breakdown of mutual trust and confidence between shareholders in a closely held company may justify winding-up, even where the company remains financially solvent and operationally functional.
However, winding-up is not the same as compelling a shareholder to sell their shares. It involves bringing the company's existence to an end through liquidation and may have significant consequences for its employees, creditors and business operations.
COURT-ORDERED COMPULSORY BUY-OUTS
Section 163 of the Act provides a remedy where a shareholder or director establishes that conduct falling within the scope of the section is oppressive, unfairly prejudicial or unfairly disregards their interests.
Where the statutory requirements are satisfied, the Court has broad powers to grant appropriate relief. Importantly, section 163(2)(h) expressly empowers the Court to order the company or another person to purchase a shareholder's shares.
However, the mere existence of a shareholder dispute or the breakdown of a business relationship does not automatically entitle a shareholder to relief under section 163. The applicant must establish conduct that satisfies the statutory requirements before the Court may exercise its discretion to grant an appropriate remedy.
LESSONS FROM RECENT CASE LAW
The Gauteng Division of the High Court, Pretoria, recently considered these issues in Hui Zhuang and Another v Empire Purification (Pty) Ltd and Others (Case No. 2025-031785, judgment delivered on 6 May 2026).
The company was established as a joint venture between two groups of shareholders. Yulan Shi held 40% of the shares, while Cindy Henderson and Petru Henderson each held 30%. Hui Zhuang, although not a registered shareholder, had contributed financially to the business and claimed to be a creditor in respect of loans advanced to the company.
Over time, the relationship between the parties deteriorated, resulting in disputes over the company's management, financial affairs and the proposed sale of shares. Despite exploring various buy-out arrangements, the parties could not agree on an acceptable separation.
The minority shareholder and her husband subsequently applied for the winding-up of the company. The remaining shareholders opposed the application and brought a counter-application under section 163 of the Act, seeking an order compelling the minority shareholder to sell her shares.
The Court dismissed the counter-application, finding that the respondents had failed to establish the statutory requirements for relief under section 163. In particular, the Court held that the applicants' exercise of their statutory right to seek liquidation did not, without more, constitute oppressive or unfairly prejudicial conduct.
Significantly, the respondents' own attorneys had previously indicated, on two separate occasions, that liquidation appeared to be the appropriate course. The Court considered their subsequent attempt to resist liquidation and compel a buy-out to be inconsistent with their earlier position.
The Court further found that the company operated as a quasi-partnership, founded on mutual trust and confidence between a small group of shareholders. That relationship had irretrievably broken down, and the parties had been unable to agree on a commercially acceptable separation.
Accordingly, the Court dismissed the section 163 counter-application and granted a provisional winding-up order under section 81(1)(d)(iii) of the Act, finding that it was just and equitable to do so.
The judgment demonstrates that although a court may order a compulsory share purchase under section 163, the breakdown of a business relationship does not, in itself, justify such an order. Where the statutory requirements for a compulsory buy-out are absent, but the relationship underpinning a closely held company has irretrievably broken down, winding-up on just-and-equitable grounds may instead be appropriate.
WHAT SHOULD SHAREHOLDERS DO BEFORE APPROACHING COURT?
Where shareholders can no longer work together, litigation need not be the first step.
The parties should consider reviewing the company's MOI and shareholders' agreement to determine whether any contractual exit or deadlock resolution mechanisms apply. They may also explore a negotiated buy-out, obtain an independent share valuation or attempt to resolve the dispute through mediation.
It is equally important to consider any outstanding shareholder loan accounts. A transfer of shares does not automatically extinguish amounts that the company may separately owe to the departing shareholder, and these obligations should be addressed as part of any proposed settlement.
Taking these steps early may enable shareholders to reach a commercially viable resolution while preserving the value and continued operation of the business.
CONCLUSION
A shareholder cannot ordinarily be compelled to sell their shares merely because the relationship between shareholders has broken down. However, a valid shareholders' agreement, the company's MOI or an appropriate court order may provide a mechanism for a compulsory share transfer.
The Empire Purification judgment illustrates that where shareholders can no longer work together, the consequences may extend beyond a dispute over ownership and ultimately threaten the continued existence of the company.
Carefully drafted shareholders' agreements and MOIs, particularly those containing clear exit and deadlock resolution provisions, can help shareholders navigate disputes and avoid costly litigation.
At Le Roux Vivier Attorneys, we assist companies, shareholders and directors with shareholders' agreements, Memoranda of Incorporation, share valuations and buy-out arrangements, shareholder disputes, corporate restructuring and commercial litigation.
Ezekiel Dikio
LLB
Associate at Le Roux Vivier Attorneys
Disclaimer: The views expressed in this article are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of the firm. This content is provided for general information only and does not constitute legal advice. While every effort is made to ensure accuracy, the law may change and its application depends on the specific facts of each matter. Readers should seek professional legal advice before acting on any information contained herein. The firm and the author(s) accept no liability for any loss or damage arising from reliance on this content.

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